Prime Minister of India Mr. Manmohan Singh is visiting Washington this week and the Indian media is gung –ho about this trip. Maybe we the people of South Asian stock are excited by platitude. Look at the real picture.

When he visited Asia recently, Obama conveyed messages of hope and upbeat trend in relationship with Asia pacific. In an elegant speech delivered in Tokyo, he ran through the gamut of nations as he articulated his Asian policy in Tokyo. President Obama ran through the gamut of nations -    China, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  Conspicuous by its absence was India. Was India not on his radar? Or was it such a close ally that he skipped naming it at a public function? It should have left New Delhi wondering.

Just two days later after this speech where he ignored India, he delivered another bombshell.  He did something even more astonishing by acquiescing in a Chinese demand to let Beijing assume the role of a monitor in South Asia, an area where China is seen by India as part of the problem, not the solution. As Manmohan Singh heads to Washington this weekend for a state visit with Obama, capping a week of US-Asia engagement, it is becoming increasingly obvious that something is amiss in Indo-US relations. It appears that the growing mutual   trust fostered by the much-maligned George Bush and Manmohan Singh, seems to be chipping at the edges. The meeting in Washington could make the growing edginess apparent.

There will, no doubt, be an accumulation of many small ideas - agriculture, education, technology, climate change, business, counter-terrorism, and so on - which would be cemented by the good personal chemistry between Manmohan Singh and Obama at the summit. But would it all add to the big picture that was emerging between the two biggest democracies of the world? What is this "big picture”? The Americans have articulated it thus. In March 2005, the Bush administration's advisor, Philip Zelikow, defined its new policy on South Asia, saying: "(The US’) goal is to help India become a major world power in the 21st century. We understand fully the implications, including military implications of this statement." Former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill recently elaborated on it, "Bush based his transformation of US-India relations on the core strategic principle of democratic India as a key factor in balancing the rise of Chinese power. This was not based on the concept of containing China. Rather, it centered on the idea that the US and India had enormous equities in promoting responsible international policies on the part of China and that deep US-India bilateral cooperation in that respect was in the vital national interests of both countries."

In other words, the US was beginning to see India as a key player in Asia, at par with China; in fact, possibly as a democratic counterweight to an overtly ambitious China. Indo-US relations started on this new path which culminated with the nuclear deal. That was expected to be a new beginning - the beginning of the game-changing experience.

Somewhere it seems the Obama administration doesn't have, or haven't yet developed, a taste for the experience. Suffering from political myopia, it is not yet able to see the next stage of the transformation. For, the big picture is ultimately about transforming institutions and mindsets of the administration of the two countries. William Cohen, former US defence secretary, doesn't quite agree. He told Crest: "I think President Obama has a big picture on India, for he decided months ago to host PM Singh for the first official state visit of his presidency. It is well understood in policy circles in Washington, but perhaps not expressed clearly or often enough, that India continues to play a critical role in the stability of South Asia. President Obama is trying to develop relationships on a broad base to promote stability and peace in the world."

Cohen's optimism isn't shared by Ashley Tellis, senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment. Says Tellis: "The Obama administration is not thinking in geopolitical terms." Adds an Indian official: "This administration is taking a regime-centred approach to international politics. That is a structural flaw." As a matter of fact, New Delhi is still to get a handle on the Obama administration's strategic priorities where India is concerned. Says a top Indian official: "We understand America's tactical compulsions. What we don't understand is what is its big strategy."

Some analysts might opine that it's still early to expect a clear strategic direction from the Obama regime. For one thing, it's still only Obama's first year in office (it took Bush and Bill Clinton four years to start a meaningful engagement with India). For another, Obama was thrown into the deep end with the financial crisis, Iraq and then the war in Afghanistan forcing him to take up the urgent before the important. So, it would be silly to get impatient, say the analysts , while pointing out that Obama will be in India before another year is out, which too will be a first for a US President. It was also possible, they say, the structural imbalances between the US and China - caused by the financial crisis - is forcing Obama to be more pliant than he would have been otherwise.

So, as Obama feels his way, could New Delhi stepped into the breach? Yes, perhaps, but India's foreign policy has been traditionally passive, and reaction-oriented. What has possibly caused greater inertia in South Block is that, at the officials' level, there are still apprehensions about being seen as a US partner. This is a far cry from the almost lusty way in which Indian and US civil society rush to engage - through business, education, and every other 21st century attribute. The contrast only reinforces the need to change the mindset of officialdom. Unless changed, small things can become big irritants. This used to be the case in the Clinton years, because there was no big idea behind the relationship. The pattern is again becoming similar.

When Obama said that a resolution of the Kashmir problem was the basic key to sorting out the mess in Afghanistan, it set Indian hackles up. Likewise, when Stanley McCrystal stated in his review that Indian activity in Afghanistan was raising concerns in Pakistan , India got deeply upset, without really engaging with the Americans on this front. In fact, in all these months, only former Indian foreign secretary Shiv Shankar Menon made the effort to intensively engage with the Obama administration and provide them with an understanding of Indian strategic thought. With the US-China joint statement this week, New Delhi is bristling yet again in the belief that Obama is giving China a free rein at a time when India-China ties are particularly low.

All of this has made Indo-US relations once again arrhythmic. The two countries are rarely moving in pace, and often botching up things even in those areas where they had developed an understanding. On Afghanistan, for instance, American and Indian policies are running largely parallel to each other. India is one of the largest stakeholders in Afghanistan after the US, and yet there is no coordination between the two, largely because Washington is still too busy trying to keep the Pakistan generals in humour by giving them all kinds of sops. India feels, as a result, jihadis are virtually running the show in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. But no one is still taking the initiative to make Washington see reason.

China is more complicated than Pakistan or Afghanistan. As it happens, this is China's ascendant star, and both India and the US concede as much. However, what is worrying folks in New Delhi is whether Obama's Asia tour, especially his statement in China, indicates his desire to wind down the American super-power status in the region . If that were so, China will move to fill in the vacuum not because it's pushy and aggressive but because US would be ceding far too much ground. The alarm at this possibility was in evidence this week as Obama travelled through China.

Many felt Obama went to China "as a profligate spender going to see his banker." And China never let him forget it. Not only were his public events censored, he was the first US president in a while not to get a live broadcast in China. Also the Chinese managed to get a joint statement out of a US president after failing to do so for eight years with George Bush.

The new US thinking on China is to try and persuade China to sit hard on Pakistan regarding its support to terrorists and Al Qaeda. But this thinking, according to Indian strategists, is flawed because it's not in Chinese interest to make Pakistan "behave" with India. The strategy could end up as a repeat of the North Korean experience. China believes it has India pinned by Pakistan and its jihadi antics the same way it believes it has Japan pinned with North Korea and its nuclear antics. China, therefore has little reason to help clean up Pakistan.

The world around India is not looking good. And with the US otherwise occupied, there could be a dangerous drift in Indo-US relations. The instinctive official Indian response is that this is the time to batten down the hatches. Among the South Block mandarins the thought process is: “Keep your head down. Let us consolidate the gains we have made with the US over the past few years." These would be incremental gains for India in development and economic areas, security and defence. It would seem Obama also thinks along these lines. As he had said: "Our rapidly growing and deepening friendship with India offers benefits to all the world's citizens as our scientists solve environmental challenges together , our doctors discover new medicines , our engineers advance our societies , our entrepreneurs generate prosperity , our educators lay the foundation for our future generations, and our governments work together to advance peace, prosperity, and stability."

I do not agree with the idea that that biding the time is a bright idea. This is the time for India to take the lead in the relationship. Obama changed the rules of the game in China, when he said conflict was no longer possible, but competition was. India should step into the breach, and offer to partner US in innovations, technology, and other areas, to redefine the global race once more. Obama finds the thought of China being US' banker disagreeable. India should now reach out and partner the US to wean it off that dependency. Tellis says that Obama should take the initiative and support India at the UN Security Council , bring it into the global non-proliferation regime, so by time US convenes its nuclear security summit in 2010, India is there as leader of the disarmament ideal.

The situation might degenerate in the pre-liberalization era, where both countries expressed cordiality, but at every opportunity, there was perceptible tilt against India. It would seem that unless India takes the lead in Indo-US ties, it will continue to be wary of Obama. And from there, a return to distrust in bilateral relationship is not such a big step away.